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This paper studies the impact of inaccurate demand beliefs on dynamic quantity-setting
market games. The conventional assumption that players share a uniform and accurate
demand model in game is relaxed by a more realistic model—players individually make
their subjective demand estimation possibly with errors. A dynamic game with such sub-
jective demand belief for two heterogeneous players is built. Based on this model, the
impact of demand belief errors on the game’s equilibriums and their stability is investi-
gated. The results shows that the stability region is not only determined by the parameters
of the system configuration and the bidding adjustment-as pointed out in conventional
model, but also by the player’s imperfect knowledge about the market. Thus new dynamic
behaviors and instability may arise given an original error-free system (where all players
are assumed to have perfect and uniform knowledge about the market). It is suggested that
in order to avoid possible system instability, the design of players’s adjustment speed, and
the possible demand belief errors from different players must be taken into account. More-
over, this paper points out that the various behavior patterns of players have different
influence on the stability regions and corresponding dynamic characteristics of system
equilibriums. The changes of players’s profits and customer surplus induced by inaccurate
beliefs are also studied. The stability analyses, dynamics behaviors, and system perfor-
mance in steady state are validated with a set of numerical experiments.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In conventional dynamic quantity-setting market games, all players are assumed to share one accurate demand function
of market. Thus all players adjust their strategies based on one uniform demand function and therefore the equilibriums of
games can be obtained with this assumption. The dynamics of such system have been intensively investigated in literature
such as [1,7,4,20,9,13]. Assuming linear cost functions, Refs. [1,7] analyzed the dynamics of oligopoly games with three, four
and N players respectively with the naive expectation of the rivals’s strategies. With the similar game setting as [1,7], a three-
dimension (player) game was discussed pertaining to multiple Nash equilibrium and their basin attraction in [3]. In many
works such as [15], the expectations to rivals’s behavior are assumed as homogeneous, i.e., all players take the same adjust-
ment or learning rule. Comparatively, Agiza [4], Ahmed and Agiza [5], Agiza and Elsadany [9], Yassen and Agize [11], Angelini
et al. [12], and Fan et al. [13] researched the dynamics of system with heterogeneous players to overcome this homogeneous
assumption.
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shared by all players. In the realistic systems, market demand functions are influenced by many different factors and there
is no commonly agreed function available for all the players. Each player has to construct its own market demand function
for bidding with all available data: history public data and its private information. Compared to real market model, in most
cases players more or less have some demand evaluation error or bias towards real market demand model-denoted as ‘‘sub-
jective demand error’’. Thus, it is important to study how the game will be changed with those demand errors, in term of, e.g.,
game equilibrium, steady state and system performance. The proposed question in this paper is derived from concerns of
practical economic systems. Taking electricity market for example, electricity suppliers have to evaluate demand themselves
with limited information during each bidding stage. Such demand errors exist for all market players. It means that if N play-
ers exist in the system, there maybe also exit N demand errors.
A few works have been done in investigating the system dynamics, equilibrium offset and system performance as results
of incomplete knowledge of players with heterogeneous behavior. Ref. [14] studies the impact of a misspecified demand
function on the steady state and the related attraction basins of a symmetric duopoly system. However, it did not consider
the asymmetric system with heterogeneous players’s behavior, which conform more to the reality. Ref. [10] proposes a
method to learn demand function in a repeated oligopoly game via a closed loop feedback of real market price which adjusts
the evaluated demand function. Similarly, it also just investigates the symmetric systemwith simple naive expectation. Little
work has been done with the heterogeneous market players.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of inaccurate demand belief towards game with heterogeneous players, focusing on
the following perspectives:
 Change of game equilibrium induced by demand belief errors.
 New stability region of game’s equilibrium associated with demand belief errors.
 Impact of demand belief errors on equilibrium output and profits of players and consumer surplus.
We first briefly describe the general dynamic bidding process in which a uniform and accurate market demand model
exists. A market equilibrium model is then set up. Afterwards, the subjective response functions—extending the conven-
tional response function with players’s demand evaluation errors—are introduced. Thus the imperfect market knowledge
can be explicit studied. In this work, two players, namely best response (or Cournot) player and bounded rationality player,
are modeled. Correspondingly, a subjective duopoly game with players’s demand errors is set up. Based on this game, the
impact of demand errors held by heterogeneous players on dynamic game is analyzed. The analyses are validated by numer-
ical experiments including stability analyses, bifurcation diagram and equilibrium calculation. Discussions on the conver-
gent state for error-free system and error-bear system are also provided.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the equilibrium model without and with the demand
belief errors in the game with heterogeneous behavior rules. Section 3 models bidding dynamics in a duopoly game; the
equilibrium points and the stability conditions are given as well. In Section 4, the numerical simulations are done to show
the dynamic behaviors induced by demand errors. The final section concludes the paper.
2. Models
2.1. Player’s model without demand belief error
In this section, we briefly introduce the game model without considering demand belief errors, which is commonly used
in most games [5,6,16,9,17,13]. Players anticipate their responses based on a uniform market demand model.
Supposing there are N players in the market, they compete with each other to supply goods. The total system demand D
and the supply quantity of player i satisfyD ¼
XN
i¼1
qi ¼ qi þ qi; ð1Þwhere, qi ¼
PN
j¼1ðj–iÞqj is the total quantity supplied by the competitors of player i.p ¼ f ðDÞ ¼ f ðqi þ qiÞ: ð2Þ
The derivative of the above function associated with any positive demand value is negative. In order to make a balance of
modeling accuracy and analytical complexity, the demand function is assumed to be time-independent. The static linear
decreasing demand function form is commonly used:p ¼ A kðqi þ qiÞ; ð3Þ
where, coefficient A > 0 is the intercept and k > 0 is the slope of the demand curve.
In a competitive market, a player has to strategically schedule its generation qi to maximize its profit. For player i, at time
t, the expected maximal profit problem can be formalized as follows:
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s:t: qimin 6 qiðtÞ 6 qimax;
ð4Þwhere PiðtÞ is the profit of player i at time t. pðtÞ is the market price of time t, which is an exogenous value for all players.
qimin and qimax are the minimal and maximal generation capacity for player i. CiðqiðtÞÞ is the production cost with the quantity
qi at time t for the player i, which takes the form of the following quadratic function in this paper:CiðqiÞ ¼ 0:5  ciq2i ; ð5Þ
where ci > 0 is the coefficient of the cost curve for player i.
The market price at time t in (4) is not only dependent on the player itself but is also determined by the other competitors.
So the optimal decision for player i actually becomes the solution of an optimization problem such as:qi ðt þ 1Þ ¼ argmax
qiðtþ1Þ
Piðqiðt þ 1Þ; qiðtÞ; qei;j–iðt þ 1ÞÞ; i; jð–iÞ ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n; ð6Þwhere qei;j–iðt þ 1Þ is the behavior evaluation for player j by player i at time t þ 1. From (6) one can see that before player i
develops its optimal quantity for the next time period t þ 1, it has to evaluate its rivals’s behaviors at time t þ 1, i.e.,
qei;j–iðt þ 1Þ.
So far the optimal decision model for a player has been described. This model adopts a centralized and homogeneous
manner in which market demand model is shared by all players and is assumed to coincide with the real one. However,
in reality, for instance in electricity markets, various generation companies would utilize different modeling methods
(e.g., regression modeling) to analyze the available historical data and construct their own demand evaluation functions. Par-
tially available information and different exposure towards the information makes it very hard for players to reach a com-
monly-agreed demand function. Practically, even with the same historical demand price pair data, the various players could
have distinct interpretations. The evaluated demand functions, as a consequence, could have minor deviations from their
peers’s and the actual one as well. In the next part, we are going to study how players develop their response functions when
the demand errors are introduced in decision process.
2.2. Player’s model with subjective demand belief error
We assume that a true market demand function exists and is denoted as the reference demand function frðD; tÞ, which
could be associated with time. For each player the time-dependent demand curve fiðD; tÞ can be denoted by multiplying
the reference demand frðD; tÞ with an error coefficient eiðtÞ which depends on time as well. Then the actual demand function
held by player i is called its subjective demand function. It is described as follows:fiðD; tÞ ¼ eiðtÞ  frðD; tÞ: ð7Þ
If the demand function takes the form of (3), the Eq. (7) can be further developed as:piðtÞ ¼ eiðtÞðA kðqi þ qiÞÞ: ð8Þ
We assume that the estimation executed by each player is comparably accurate, thus for any D and t, the range of the
error coefficient is between (0, 2). The coefficient value indicates the imperfection degree of a player about the environment.
It can be a constant value or time-varying or even stochastic. In constant cases, eiðtÞ ¼ 1 means that the evaluated demand
function coincides with the true one; eiðtÞ > 1 means that the demand is overestimated by player; likewise, eiðtÞ < 1 means
the case where the demand is underestimated. In the following part, we will show how such incorrect estimation will impact
the dynamic performance and the equilibrium of dynamic system.
2.3. Behavior models
With the subjective demand function as form (8), the marginal profit of the player i at time t is the derivative of profit
calculated with (4) associated to quantity qi :@
Q
iðei; tÞ
@qiðtÞ
¼ eiðtÞA eiðtÞkqei;iðtÞ  ðci þ 2  eiðtÞ  kÞ  qiðtÞ: ð9ÞIf letting (9) equal to zero, the developed strategy, i.e., optimal quantity output, is called Subjective Best Reply, as follows:eRiðeiðt þ 1Þ; qiðt þ 1Þ; qiðt þ 1ÞÞ ¼ eiðt þ 1Þ  A eiðt þ 1Þ  k  qei;iðt þ 1Þci þ 2  eiðt þ 1Þ  k ; ð10Þ
where eRiðÞ is the subjective response function based on the subjective demand belief for player i. Compared to the conven-
tional best reply function Riðqiðt þ 1Þ; qiðt þ 1ÞÞ, the subjective best reply implies that player develops its strategies based
on its own subjective demand evaluation other than on a uniform one shared within the system. The belief errors are
brought into decision making process explicitly. The obtained subjective reply function is not only determined by its rivals’
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plify the following discussions, we only discuss time-independent coefficients:1 ~E1 aeiðtÞ ¼ ei: ð11Þ
According to the subjective best reply function (10), players can use their internal logic to evaluate the output/behavior of
their rivals, i.e., qei;j–iðt þ 1Þ, and develop their bids. The naïve expectation, a commonly used expectation rule proposed by
Cournot in (A. Cournot 1838), assumes a player’s rivals’ behavior of the next period keeping the same as those happened
in the preceding period, i.e.,qei;j–iðt þ 1Þ ¼ qjðtÞ: ð12Þ
Then with (10)–(12), the dynamic bidding process for a naïve player based on its subjective demand belief can be mod-
eled as:qiðt þ 1Þ ¼
ei  A ei  k  qjðtÞ
2  ei  kþ ci : ð13ÞBesides naïve expectation behavior rule, a more sophisticated model has been developed, such as bounded rationality [5].
Based on the assumption that player is myopic, the bounded rationality is derived to mitigate the concern that the market is
far from complete. Thus players estimate marginal profit
@
Q
i
ðtÞ
@qiðtÞ locally. The optimal decision is tuned according to the direc-
tion of estimated marginal profits. If the direction displays a positive trend, the player would like to increase its profit, other-
wise to decrease. The dynamic bounded rational player has the form:qiðt þ 1Þ ¼ qiðtÞ þ aiqiðtÞ
@
Q
iðei; tÞ
@qiðtÞ
; i ¼ 1;2; . . . ; n; ð14Þwhere ai > 0 is an adjustment factor for a bounded rational player.
It is worth to note that in this paper the bounded rational player also has subjective features as its bidding decisions are
based on its own demand beliefs. Its belief deviations from actual demand models are brought into bidding evolution
process.
This section defines the subjective best reply behavior mechanism and two different dynamic behavior models based on
subjective belief. In the next session, a duopoly system consisting of two heterogeneous behavior players, each of whom
embedded with their subjective demand beliefs, will be modeled. The equilibriums and the stability of this subjective het-
erogeneous duopoly game will be analyzed afterwards.
3. Bidding dynamics in subjective heterogeneous duopoly game
3.1. A dynamic duopoly map with subjective demand belief
By combining dynamic equations (13) and (14) subjective duopoly game consisting of two heterogeneous players is set
up. Mathematically a dynamic map is therefore as follows:~X :
q1ðt þ 1Þ ¼ e1Ae1kq2ðtÞ2e1kþc1 ;
q2ðt þ 1Þ ¼ q2ðtÞ þ aq2ðtÞðe2A ð2e2kþ c2Þq2ðtÞ  e2kq1ðtÞÞ:
(
ð15Þ3.2. System equilibriums
The equilibrium points of the game represented by (15) are defined as the non-negative fixed points of the dynamic sys-
tem. By setting qiðt þ 1Þ ¼ qiðtÞ; i ¼ 1;2 the fixed points of the system (15) are obtained via solving the corresponding alge-
braic system:~X :
0 ¼ e1A ð2e1kþ c1Þq1  e1kq2;
0 ¼ q2ðe2A ð2e2kþ c2Þq2  e2kq1Þ:

ð16ÞAfter solving (16), two fixed points, ~E1 and ~E1 are obtained for this system:~E1 ¼ e1A
2e1kþ c1 ;0
 
;
~E1 ¼ ~q1; ~q2
 
;
ð17Þwhere,nd ~E1 are distinguished from the expression of the equilibrium of an error-free system where there is no demand belief error.
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Ae1ðc2 þ ke2Þ
c1c2 þ 2c1e2kþ 2c2e1kþ 3e1e2k2
;
~q2 ¼
Ae2ðc1 þ ke1Þ
c1c2 þ 2c1e2kþ 2c2e1kþ 3e1e2k2
:
ð18ÞPoint ~E1 is judged as a boundary equilibrium since it is located on the boundary of the decision set of system
D ¼ fqijqi P 0ði ¼ 1;2Þg. ~E is the unique Nash equilibrium point, which is the intersection point of the two curves. It can
be seen that the Nash point ~Eð~q1; ~q2Þ is independent from the value of rationale adjustment factor a. Again, that means the-
oretically the steady state of this dynamic map is not determined by a player’s adjustment speed, but just inherently by the
parameters of the system characteristics. Moreover it is observed that the two elements of Eqs. (18) are symmetric. Thus a
compatible form of Nash equilibrium points of (18) can be rewritten as follows:~qi ¼
Aeiðcj þ kejÞ
cicj þ 2ciejkþ 2cjeikþ 3eiejk2
ði; j ¼ 1;2; i– jÞ: ð19Þ3.3. Offset of Nash equilibriums induced by demand error
With the player’s demand belief error being introduced, the system’s Nash equilibriums change compared to those in an
error-free system. Without loss of generality in this part we reduce the number of parameters by setting the marginal cost of
two players equally, i.e., c1 ¼ c2 ¼ c. This allows us to explore the offset of Nash points by focusing on the effect of the de-
mand error parameter eiði ¼ 1;2Þ.
3.3.1. Nash points in error-free system-benchmark
If the players have perfect knowledge, their subjective demand functions totally coincide with the real one. Replacing
e1 ¼ e2 ¼ 1 and c1 ¼ c2 ¼ c in (18), thus, the Nash equilibriums of two players in such error-free system become:qi ¼
A
3kþ c ; ði ¼ 1;2Þ: ð20ÞThis result matches the results in Ref. [21]. These obtained Nash points are set as the benchmark points. The offset of Nash
points will be made by comparing those in the system with demand errors.
3.3.2. Offset of Nash equilibriums caused by a single demand error
If in system only one player has demand belief error, while the other players are assumed to be players without demand
errors, replacing ei – 1; ej ¼ 1ðj– iÞ and ci ¼ c ði ¼ 1;2Þ into (18), the Nash equilibrium points in a single demand error sys-
tem become:~qi ¼
Aeiðc þ kÞ
3kc þ 4eik2 þ c2 þ 2ceik
;
~qj ¼
Aðc þ eikÞ
3kc þ 4eik2 þ c2 þ 2ceik
ðj – iÞ:
ð21ÞWe compare the benchmark value (20) to the Nash equilibrium point (21) in single demand error system. The relation of
qi and ~q

i follows:~qi ¼
eiðc þ kÞðc þ 3kÞ
2ckþ 3eik2 þ c2 þ 2ceik
qi ;
~qj ¼
ðc þ eikÞðc þ 3kÞ
2ckþ 3eik2 þ c2 þ 2ceik
qj ðj – iÞ:It shows that this single demand error results in the change of two players’s equilibrium outputs.
3.3.3. Offset of Nash equilibriums caused by multiple demand errors
If both players possess demand errors, then (18) turns to be one with ei; ej – 1 ðj– iÞ and ci ¼ c ði ¼ 1;2Þ. We compare the
benchmark to the Nash equilibrium point to see how the Nash equilibrium point differs. The relation of qi and
~~qi follows:~~qi ¼
eiðc þ 3kÞðc þ kejÞ
c2 þ 2ceikþ 2cejkþ 3eiejk2
ði; j ¼ 1;2; i– jÞ:It can be seen by all demand error parameters have impact on the change of Nash equilibrium points.
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To investigate the local stability of the equilibrium points ~E1 and ~E the Jacobian matrix for the system of (15) at these two
points should be formulated firstly. The Jacobian matrix for (15) is developed as follows:Jðq1; q2Þ ¼
0  e1k2e1kþc1
aq2e2k 1 aq2ð2e2kþ c2Þ  aðq2ð2e2kþ c2Þ  e2Aþ e2kq1Þ
" #
:The necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium points to be asymptotically stable are that all roots of the char-
acteristic equations have magnitudes of eigenvalues less than 1.
3.4.1. Stability of boundary equilibrium point ~E1
The Jacobian matrix at the point ~E1 has the following form:J1ð~E1Þ ¼
0  e1k2e1kþc1
0 1þ aðAe2  Ae1e2k2e1kþc1Þ
24 35:
The two eigenvalues of J1ð~E1Þ are respectively: k1 ¼ 0; k2 ¼¼ 1þ aðAe1e2kþAe2c12e1kþc1 Þ.
As defined in the previous part, all parameters in the investigated system, i.e., a;A; k; c1; c2; e1; e2 are positive. Hence it can
be derived that k2j jP 1. Then is an unstable equilibrium point of dynamic system (15).
3.4.2. Stability of Nash equilibrium point ~E
The Jacobian matrix at the point ~E has the following form:Jð~EÞ ¼ 0 
e1k
2e1kþc1
aq2e2k 1 aq2ð2e2kþ c2Þ  aðq2ð2e2kþ c2Þ  e2Aþ e2kq1Þ
" #
:Following the Jury stability criterion [18], the system (15) is stable if and only if the following conditions are satisfied.1 TrðJÞ þ DetðJÞ > 0;
1þ TrðJÞ þ DetðJÞ > 0;
1 DetðJÞ > 0;
ð22Þwhere TrðJÞ and DetðJÞ are the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix Jð~EÞ.
For the given system configuration of A; k; c1; c2; e1; e2, the region defined by (22) identifies the region of local stability of
the Nash equilibrium ~E with respect to adjustment factor a vs. demand error degree ei ði ¼ 1;2Þ in the parameter plane.
3.4.3. Impact of demand errors on stability regions in parameter space
This section studies the impact of demand error on the stability region via one numerical case. The cost function data of
two players and the reference demand function taken from Ref. [19] are shown in Table 1.
(a) Stability region of error-free system.
If we set e1 ¼ e2 ¼ 1, then the stability region defined by (22) is related to the error-free system. Thus for a given system
the stability region is one dimension since it is just dependent on the adjustment factor a, i.e., 0 < a 6 0:0665.
(b) Stability region of system with demand errors.
With the introduction of demand errors from the best response player and the bounded rational player, by (22), the sta-
bility regions are not one dimensional anymore. It is defined in a three-dimension space, namely ðe1; e2;aÞ space. As shown in
Fig. 1, the stability region for system (15) is the space below the surface and three axes ðe1; e2;aÞ.
Fig. 2a and b shows the projection of the stability region in ða; e1ðe2ÞÞ plane with five cutting planes of e2ðe1Þ = 0.1, 0.5, 1,
1.5 and 2, respectively. In two figures, the areas surrounded by the colored lines and two axes are the stability regions. The
black line outlines the stability region in single demand error case. The intersection point of two blue dotted lines and the
black line is the threshold value of a for the stability region in the error-free system, i.e., a ¼ 0:0665. The other four linesTable 1
Data of players and reference demand function.
Player 1 Player 2 Reference demand
c1 ¼ 0:025 c2 ¼ 0:0175 A = 35, k = 0.018
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
e1
Stability region in (e1, e2, α) space
e2
α
Fig. 1. Stability region in ðe1; e2;aÞ space.
α
e 1
Stability region of e1 vs. α  with varying e2
← e2=0.1
← e2=0.5
← e2=1
← e2=1.5
← e2=2
α=0.0665
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α
e 2
Stability region of e2 vs. α  with varying e1
← e1=0.1
← e1=0.5
← e1=1
← e1=1.5← e1=2
α=0.0665
0.050.060.070.080.09
0.8
1
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Stability region in plane ða; ei ði ¼ 1;2ÞÞ with different ejði– jÞ.
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mely) underestimating to (extremely) overestimating demand.
(1) Case: single demand error.
The single demand error case corresponds to the black line in Fig. 2a and b. Firstly, it is obvious that the existences of the
demand belief error do have impact on the stability region of system’s Nash equilibrium.With the demand errors introduced,
the region of a is reshaped by the demand error eiði ¼ 1;2Þ compared to the original area defined by 0 < a 6 0:0665 for the
error-free system.
Furthermore, our results show that the impacts of demand belief error on the stability region are also influenced by the
different bidding behavior patterns of each player. Observed from the black line in Fig. 2a, when the bounded rational player
is assumed to have accurate demand belief, the demands being from underestimated to overestimated by the best response
player result in the stability regions correspondingly changing from the shrank state (i.e., the area below the line of e1 ¼ 1) to
the expanded state (i.e., the area above the line of e1 ¼ 1) if setting error-free system as benchmark. While, by comparison, in
Fig. 2b the opposite trend is witnessed for the change of stability region induced by the bounded rational player’s belief error
when best response player holds the accurate market function. In this case, for e1 < 1, the range of a is extended, and vice
versa.
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The multiple demand error cases are shown by the colored lines both in Fig. 2a and b. Since two players have distinct
behavior patterns, the changing trends of stability regions defined by ða; e1ðe2ÞÞ with various e2ðe1Þ are distinct. In Fig. 2a,
with the demand being from (extremely) underestimated to (extremely) overestimated by the bounded rational player,
the stability region originally displayed in Fig. 2a changes from the shrank states to the expanded states. While Fig. 2b shows
that the stability regions in ða; e2Þ plane change from the shrank states to the expanded states with the increasing e1.
Moreover, two figures demonstrate that the stability region defined in ða; e1Þ plane is more sensitive to the demand errors
from the bounded rational player than what happened in ða; e2Þ plane. For instance, when e2 changing from 0.1 to 0.5, the
stability region in ða; e1Þ plane shrinks approximately by 83%, while only 3% for the cases described in Fig. 2b.
The analyses above suggest that even for a given value of a which makes the error-free system stable (or instable), the
practical existence of the demand belief errors probably alter the original states. For instance, new dynamics of system Nash
equilibrium could be induced by those demand errors if the given a falls outside of the stability region defined in ðe1; e2;aÞ
space. The conventional models such as [15,2], due to the assumption of uniformmarket function, did not foresee the impact
of demand errors. We believe that a similar conclusion can be applied to N-player system.
The importance to identify the stability regions of system considering possible demand error in system can be highlighted
with a realistic system. For instance two electricity suppliers bid in electricity market with no transmission constraints. In
order to avoid the oscillation of instability, the adjustment factor a in the system should be carefully designed. If the possible
demand errors are ignored, some values located in the stability region of error-free system can possibly lead system into
oscillation which is dangerous and should be avoided for the safety of underlying physical electricity system [8].
4. Numerical simulations of dynamic behavior
After discussing the local stability results in the previous section, in this section we are going to investigate numerically
the dynamics of the model (15). The bifurcation analyses are performed for output q1; q2 versus error parameter e1 ði ¼ 1;2Þ
for the system structure listed in Table 1.
4.1. Case A: dynamics of error-free system
In the first case, the bidding process is made based on the assumption that there exists an accurate market demand func-
tion shared by both players. Thus, two demand error coefficients e1; e2 are set as 1. The dynamic behavior of the demand
error-free system has been well studied in literature [4,9,13]. It is acknowledged that system dynamics are highly influenced
by the values of the adjustment factor a. In this case, we briefly introduce the dynamics of this error-free system via bifur-
cation diagram. Fig. 3 shows the bifurcation diagram with respect to the adjustment factor a.
One can see that in Fig. 3 when a goes beyond 0.0665, the Nash equilibrium loses its stability. A period-doubling bifur-
cation occurs, at which a stable period-2 cycle comes out. With keeps increasing, a period-4 cycle comes into being. Conse-
quently with a increasing further, a cascade of infinitely many period-doubling bifurcations takes place. An example of the
dynamic bidding evolution process with a stable parameter a ¼ 0:06 is shown in Fig. 4.Fig. 3. Bifurcation diagram without demand error.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
Iterations
O
ut
pu
t
Dynamic bidding process when α=0.06
q1
q2
Fig. 4. The dynamic bidding evolution of duopoly game in stable parameter region.
538 Z. Qiu et al. / Applied Mathematics and Computation 230 (2014) 530–541One can see that with the parameters a inside stability region the bidding process will finally converge to Nash equilib-
rium after oscillating around one value (Nash equilibrium) a couple of times. The convergent output quantities for two play-
ers in this case are q1  423; q2  512.
4.2. Case B: system dynamics induced by demand errors
We keep the values of a as the one in Case A, i.e., a ¼ 0:06. On this parameter value the error-free system is stable as
shown in Fig. 4. In this case, the bifurcation diagrams manifesting the system dynamics induced by ei ði ¼ 1;2Þ with ej ¼
0.5, 1 and 1.5, respectively are shown from Fig. 5a–f. Concretely, the figures (Fig. 5a, c, and e) in the left column are the bifur-
cation diagrams w.r.t. e1 when e2 taking 0.5, 1 and 1.5 ðj ¼ 1;2; j– iÞ, respectively. Likewise, the figures (Fig. 5b, d, and f) in
the right column are diagrams w.r.t. e2 when e1 taking 0.5, 1, and 1.5, respectively.
(1) Dynamics in single demand error case.
Fig. 5c gives the bifurcation diagram of equilibrium outputs associated to the different demand error levels from best re-
sponse player when the bounded rational player has correct demand belief. It can be seen that on point a ¼ 0:06, for the
smaller e1, there are bifurcation phenomena for system equilibriums. With e1 increasing, system equilibriums tend to be
more stable. This can be explained by the facts depicted in Fig. 2a. The point a ¼ 0:06 is not inside the stability region when
e1 is below 1, which will cause system equilibriums chaotic; while for those e1 larger than 1, the value a ¼ 0:06 stays inside
the stability region. Corresponding to Fig. 5c and d illustrates the bifurcation phenomena w.r.t. bounded rational player’s
demand belief errors when the best response player is correct one. It can be seen that a higher values of give rise to a se-
quence of period-doubling bifurcations and a typical route to chaos for the surviving periodic orbit. The threshold value
of is 1.08. This phenomenon confirms the analyses for stability region when the bounded player has the inaccurate demand
belief in Section 3.
Corresponding to Fig. 5c and d illustrates the bifurcation phenomena w.r.t. bounded rational player’s demand belief errors
when the best response player is correct one. It can be seen that a higher values of e2 give rise to a sequence of period-dou-
bling bifurcations and a typical route to chaos for the surviving periodic orbit. The threshold value of e2 is 1.08. This phenom-
enon confirms the analyses for stability region when the bounded player has the inaccurate demand belief in Section 3.
(2) Dynamics in multiple demand error case.
By comprising three figures in the left column, one can see that the overestimations of demand by the bounded rational
player cause more and more serious chaos on the system equilibriums towards e1. In Fig. 5e when e2 ¼ 1:2 the chaos grad-
ually die out and a typical period-doubling bifurcation come out with e1 increasing. These phenomena match the facts in
Fig. 2a that the stability regions in ða; e1Þ plane shrink with e2 increasing. However, three figures in the right column show
that the impact of different demand error levels by the best response player on dynamic characteristics of equilibriums in
ða; e2Þ plane is not as much as those in ða; e1Þ plane. These observations validate the analyses in Section 3 that the stability
region defined in ða; e1Þ plane is more sensitive to the demand error from the bounded rational player than that in ða; e2Þ
plane.
Fig. 5. Bifurcation diagram with respect to demand errors.
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In the previous section, our bifurcation analysis has emphasized the impact of the subjective demand belief errors on the
system dynamics for a fixed adjustment factor a. This section will study the system performance in the convergent state. The
equilibrium outputs and the associated profits for two players, market price, and customer surplus are analyzed in the steady
states compared to those in the error-free system.
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Fig. 6. The system performances when error range is in ½0:9;1:1.
540 Z. Qiu et al. / Applied Mathematics and Computation 230 (2014) 530–541If we assume that the players in the game have enough rationality, a practical range for subjective belief error degree ei is
comparably close to 1. To be more realistic, we check the system performances within the error range in ½0:9;1:1. The rel-
ative results, given a ¼ 0:06, are drawn in Fig. 6.
The results in Fig. 6 reveal the following facts:
Fig. 6a points out that if the system converges with the given value of a, the underestimations (or overestimations) of
demand by the players will accordingly cause their outputs in steady state lower (or higher). Correspondingly, their profits
are decreased (or increased) along with the opposite change of market price. Moreover, when demand is underestimated (or
overestimated) by supplier, the customer surplus (Fig. 6d) is increased (or decreased). For instance, in the case when the best
player underestimates demand by 10%, the equilibrium output and profit of itself decrease by 5.1% and 1.0%, respectively,
while the bounded rational player increases its output and profit by 1.4% and 2.9%, respectively. Meanwhile, customer sur-
plus is promoted by 2.9%.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, the conventional model of dynamic quantity-setting game where players are assumed to hold a uniform and
accurate belief towards market is replaced by a more realistic model with subjective demand errors. As a consequence, the
impact of such inaccurate demand belief from players on game is thoroughly studied.
This paper firstly describes the conventional error-free game model, i.e., all players share one correct market demand
function, based on which a general bidding game is set up. Then the subjective belief errors are introduced into this model
to represent the knowledge limitations or deviations of players. The developed subjective reply function innovatively incor-
porates such belief errors as one of its variables in strategic decision process. Besides, two players with heterogeneous
behaviors are incorporated into this dynamic game. With this model, how the dynamic game is impacted by the subjective
demand belief errors is investigated. Especially the system’s equilibriums and their stabilities are analyzed. Subsequently,
the stability regions of Nash equilibrium with respect to different subjective demand belief error levels are given. Our results
show that the demand errors will reshape the stability regions of the error-free system. Thus the original parameter settings
which make error-free system stable probably give rise to the new dynamics and instability due to inaccurate demand belief
Z. Qiu et al. / Applied Mathematics and Computation 230 (2014) 530–541 541by players. Besides, the stability regions in the proposed model react differently to the players’s behavior difference. This
feature is very important in designing player’s adaptive strategy.
The limitation of the present model is that the inaccurate demand belief is fixed over the dynamic bidding process. In
practice, the demand error from player might be time-varying with the change of market information, accumulated experi-
ence and the improved demand regression models, etc. The more sophisticated learning could enable players, to some ex-
tents, to alleviate the disadvantages resulting from the belief errors. Our work in this paper would like to serve as a
benchmark study based on which closed loops to control player’s knowledge deviation to real world in bidding process could
be properly designed. The future work will distinguish the impact of time-varying errors on dynamic game and player’s stra-
tegic decision.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant nos. 61202050 and 61170325), the
Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province, China (Grant no. LY12F02041), Qian Jiang Talents Program of Zhejiang
Province, China (Grant no. 2012R10009) and Science Foundation of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University (ZSTU) under Grant no.
13032119-Y.
References
[1] H.N. Agiza, Explicit stability zones for cournot game with 3 and 4 competitors, Chaos, Solitons Fractals 9 (12) (1998) 1955–1966.
[2] H.N. Agiza, Controlling chaos for the dynamical system of coupled dynamos, Chaos, Solitons Fractals 13 (2) (2002) 341–352.
[3] H.N. Agiza, G.I. Bischi, M. Kopel, Multistability in a dynamic cournot game with three oligopolists, Math. Comput. Simul. 51 (1–2) (1999) 63–90.
[4] H.N. Agiza, A.A. Elsadany, Nonlinear dynamics in the cournot duopoly game with heterogeneous players, Physica A 320 (2003) 512–524.
[5] H.N. Agiza, A.A. Elsadany, Chaotic dynamics in nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players, Appl. Math. Comput. 149 (3) (2004) 843–860.
[6] A. Agliari, G.I. Bischi, R. Dieci, L. Gardini, Global bifurcations of closed invariant curves in two-dimensional maps: a computer assisted study, Int. J.
Bifurcation Chaos 15 (4) (2005) 1285–1328.
[7] E. Ahmed, H.N. Agiza, Dynamics of a cournot game with n-competitors, Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 9 (9) (1998) 1513–1517.
[8] F.L. Alvarado, J.P. Meng, C.L. DeMarco, W.S. Mota, Stability analysis of interconnected power systems coupled with market dynamics, IEEE Trans. Power
Syst. 16 (4) (2001) 695–701.
[9] N. Angelini, R. Dieci, F. Nardini, Bifurcation analysis of a dynamic duopoly model with heterogeneous costs and behavioural rules, Math. Comput. Simul.
79 (10) (2009) 3179–3196.
[10] G.I. Bischi, L. Sbragia, F. Szidarovszky, Learning the demand function in a repeated cournot oligopoly game, Int. J. Syst. Sci. 39 (4) (2008) 403–419.
[11] Z.W. Ding, Q.L. Hang, L.X. Tian, Analysis of the dynamics of cournot team-game with heterogeneous players, Appl. Math. Comput. 215 (3) (2009) 1098–
1105.
[12] E.M. Elabbasy, H.N. Agiza, A.A. Elsadany, Analysis of nonlinear triopoly game with heterogeneous players, Comput. Math. Appl. 57 (3) (2009) 488–499.
[13] Y.Q. Fan, T. Xie, J.G. Du, Complex dynamics of duopoly game with heterogeneous players: a further analysis of the output model, Appl. Math. Comput.
218 (15) (2012) 7829–7838.
[14] Gian-Italo Bischi, M.K. Carl Chiarella, The long run outcomes and global dynamics of a duopoly game with misspecified demand functions, Int. Game
Theory Rev. 6 (3) (2004) 343–379.
[15] M. Kopel, Simple and complex adjustment dynamics in cournot duopoly models, Chaos, Solitons Fractals 7 (12) (1996) 2031–2048.
[16] A.K. Naimzada, L. Sbragia, Oligopoly games with nonlinear demand and cost functions: two boundedly rational adjustment processes, Chaos, Solitons
Fractals 29 (3) (2006) 707–722.
[17] J. Peng, Z.H. Miao, F. Peng, Study on a 3-dimensional game model with delayed bounded rationality, Appl. Math. Comput. 218 (5) (2011) 1568–1576.
[18] S.N. Elaydi, An Introduction to Difference Equations, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1996.
[19] Y.Q. Song, Y.X. Ni, F.S. Wen, Z.J. Hou, F.F. Wu, Conjectural variation based bidding strategy in spot markets: fundamentals and comparison with classical
game theoretical bidding strategies, Electr. Power Syst. Res. 67 (1) (2003) 45–51.
[20] M.T. Yassen, H.N. Agiza, Analysis of a duopoly game with delayed bounded rationality, Appl. Math. Comput. 138 (2–3) (2003) 387–402.
[21] J.X. Zhang, Q.L. Da, Y.H. Wang, Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players, Econ. Model. 24 (1) (2007) 138–148.
